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Introduction 
For many Internet advocates the social media provides an electronic agora to allow for 
alternative issues to be raised, framed and effectively debated.  It is contended citizens may 
enjoy a real-time interactive access with one another to transmit ideas, by-pass authorities, 
challenge autocracies and affect greater forms of expression against state power. Thus, the 
social media allows for many-to-many or point-to point forms of communication. Most 
especially, online social networks such as Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter, have facilitated 
opportunities for grassroots communication, deliberation and discussion.  
This paper will analyse the democratic possibilities of technological innovations 
associated with Web 2.0 tools. First, it will address the first and second ‘waves’ of academic 
debates concerning the social media and the public sphere in the networked society. The 
initial optimism associated with a virtual public sphere was replaced by doubts about whether 
this model was appropriate for the development of democratic values. Consequently, Manual 
Castells’ contention that the information communications networks have constructed a more 
personalised form of politics proved to be vital in the discussion of citizen participation. He 
suggests that grassroots networks have established social movements characterised by new 
types of solidarity, political resistance and the circumvention of national borders by 
facilitating ‘wider spaces’ of power in the global society.  
Second, these concerns led to attention being placed upon the application of the 
networked power relations with reference to grassroots or social revolutionary movements. 
For instance, new communications environment were seen to be instrumental in forging the 
conditions for the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions within Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, along with the 
mobilization of other forms of opposition in Libya and Syria. Similar claims were made for 
the online mobilization of Iranian demonstrators in the Green Revolution in 2009 and the 
Turkish protests within Istanbul’s Taksim square during the summer of 2013. These Middle 
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Eastern case examples will be discussed along with the calls for political and economic 
change in Southern Europe within financially constrained countries of Spain and Greece. 
Third, a debate has emerged about whether the social media are reconfiguring power 
relations in terms of economic, political and social organization. For instance, are ICTs more 
effective in mobilizing voices for protest rather than formulating sustainable democratic 
institutions and political change? How effective have social media been in mobilizing voices 
for protest? Have both autocratic and democratically elected executives remained vigilant in 
protecting their interests? Thus, this paper will theorize on the key question concerning 
whether the social media can contribute to democracy, revolution and expansion of the public 
sphere, or whether they remain instruments of control and power. 
 
The Democratic Values of the Internet: From the Dutiful Citizen to the Networked 
Individual 
In a first wave of enthusiasm for the political implications of the Internet, it was predicted 
that a digital democracy would emerge on the lines of an electronic agora or public sphere. 
This model followed Jürgen Habermas’ critique concerning the rise of an organic public 
sphere which accompanied the democratic dissemination of information in the newspapers 
which emerged in the eighteenth century. He argued that the public sphere (the space 
between the state and the public in which mass communications operated) had demonstrated 
how private expressions could be transformed into public opinions. Through a range of 
‘rational’ discourses within the public arena, the media expedited a process wherein private 
citizens debated ideas so that collective decision-making could occur and tyrannical political 
power might be challenged. Consequently, the hierarchical relations between political elites 
and the masses were broken down: 
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The economic independence provided by private property, the critical reflection 
fostered by letters and novels, the flowering of discussion in coffee houses and salons 
and, above all, the emergence of an independent, market-based press, created a new 
public engaged in critical political discussion. From this was forged by a reason based 
consensus which shaped the direction of the state (Curran and Gurevitch, 1992: 83). 
 
With reference to Habermas’s deliberative arguments, it was predicted that the growth 
of Internet interactivity and decentralisation of power relations would allow for a rational and 
informed debate. For instance, Wired Magazine’s media correspondent Jon Katz compared 
the burgeoning ‘net’ to the eighteenth century pamphleteers of the American Revolution 
(Katz, 1995). It was argued that as the Internet was a global medium that digital citizens 
would not only be able to express their individual ideas but would create a diverse and 
cohesive virtual community to facilitate agency and reform (Wheeler, 1997: 224).  
However, this wave of optimism was quickly replaced by more critical accounts 
which suggested that the Internet was conditioned by prevailing economic, social and 
political interests (Street, 1996). Further, questions emerged about the value of the virtual 
democracy as post-modernist perspectives about the ‘simulacrum’ or the implosion between 
subjective and objective meaning meant that the social media became seen as a means of 
narcissistic self-interest rather than collective activity. Other cultural critiques emerged about 
the value of the public sphere model as a means to engage the wider political community (see 
Iosifidis and Wheeler, forthcoming). It was contended that gender and race issues had not 
been addressed as the ‘rational’ communications within the multi-media favoured white, 
wealthy males to the exclusion of others (Loader and Mercea, 2011: 758). It was further 
argued that the democratising and empowering function of the Internet is being exaggerated 
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and that Public Service Media are capable of developing more inclusive social frameworks 
than online providers (Iosifidis, 2011).  
 In spite of these difficulties, a new wave of social and political theories emerged in 
the wake of the development of Web 2.0 platforms. This second generation of writing about 
Internet democracy has been distinguished by the displacement of the public sphere model 
with a networked citizen perspective. Instead of Habermasian concomitants from dutiful 
citizens, the ‘drivers’ of democratic innovation have been the networks of everyday citizens 
who are engaged in lifestyle politics (Bennett 2003; Dahlgren 2009; Papacharissi 2010).In 
tandem, it has been argued that alternative forms of cognitive behaviour are occurring as new 
generations engage with the software technologies of the social media. For instance, Margaret 
Wertheim has argued that cyberspace may construct an expansive sense of the ‘self’ which 
becomes ‘almost like a fluid, leaking out around us all the time and joining each of us into a 
vast ocean or web of relationships with other leaky selves’ (Wertheim, 1999). 
Therefore, the private identities of autonomous citizens may be employed to advance 
a multitude of publicly realised political ideas and values (Loader and Mercea, 2011: 759). In 
his empirical study of Catalonian Internet users, Manuel Castells contended that personal 
autonomy is enhanced by social media usage in relation to societal rules and institutional 
power (Castells, 2007). He argues that these actors will engage in collective activity within 
the networked society to facilitate a reconfiguration of political solidarity through the 
dissemination of knowledge, the representation of alternative forms of social capital and the 
construction of grassroots engagement: 
 
Enthusiastic networked individuals ... are transformed into a conscious, collective 
actor. Thus social change results from communicative action that involves connection 
between networks ... from a communicative environment through communications 
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networks. The technology and morphology of these communications networks shapes 
the process of mobilisation, and thus social change, both as a process and an outcome 
(Castells: 2012: 219-20). 
 
The Networked Society and social revolutions 
From this perspective, the network society is constituted from autonomous individuals who 
connect with one another in an ever opening space within politics. Consequently, non-
traditional political actors have affected new forms of consciousness through blogs, tweets, 
Facebook activities and online petitions. Therefore, the virtual technology can facilitate a 
more ‘virtuous’ citizenship to reconnect the public with the democratic process to allow for 
‘civic commons’ to emerge (Putnam, 2000; Chadwick, 2006: 25). In some respects, this 
transformation reflects the pluralism in governmental decision-making that Robert Dahl 
identified when he claimed that there would be a diffusion of centralised power relations 
(Dahl, 1961). However, for Castells power: 
 
... Is no longer concentrated in institutions (the state), organizations (capitalist firms), 
or symbolic controllers (corporate media, churches). It is diffused in global networks 
of wealth, power, information and images, which circulate and transmute in a system 
of variable geometry and dematerialised geography (Castells, 2006: 359). 
 
These concerns about the location of power have led to questions about how such 
forms of representation have segued into the contested principles of late modernity or post-
democratic behaviour (Crouch, 2004). These ideas are comparable with but contest the notion 
of post-modernism, in that they suggest a self-referring modernism and fragmentation in 
which ‘social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming 
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information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character’ (Giddens, 
1991: 38). In terms of post-democratic activity, late modernists contend such changes reflect 
a replacement of hierarchies with networks; the rise of discursive network governance, the 
expansion of the social media and a constantly reformed version of contemporary democracy 
(Marsh et.al, 2010: 326).  
Clay Shirky has argued that within the networked society it becomes ‘ridiculously 
easy’ to break down the barriers which have previously closed off collective action (Shirky, 
2009). Instead, the social media encourages the formation of self-directed open source or 
hacking groups to engage in their activities and to gather together. Therefore, the old 
hierarchies of repression, corporate interest and hermetically sealed ideologies are removed to 
allow for an alternative expression of grassroots political behaviour. Such a dispersal of 
power means that cyberspace will create a public space which ultimately becomes a political 
space wherein ‘sovereign assemblies to meet and ... recover their rights of representation, 
which have been captured in political institutions predominantly tailored for the convenience 
of the dominant interests’ (Castells, 2012: 11).  
Accordingly, ICT networks will facilitate networked publics to construct their values, 
meaning and identity to affect new forms of solidarity. The Internet makes it easier to 
organize and agitate as people can participate in reality TV votes, or support a petition within 
the click of a mouse, or even force out undemocratic governments. This had led to the 
formation of networked social movements which have largely ignored the political elite, 
distrusted the established media, and have rejected any leadership, hierarchy or formal 
organisation, by using open forums for collective debate and social dialogue. This has been 
reflected in a ‘division of labour’ within activism that has been defined by the available social 
media platforms to build political consciousness: 
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If you look at the full suite of information tools that were employed to spread the 
revolutions of 2009-11, it goes like this: Facebook is used to form groups, covert and 
overt --- in order to establish those strong and flexible connections. Twitter is used for 
real-time organization and news dissemination, bypassing the cumbersome 
‘newsgathering’ operations of the mainstream media. YouTube and the Twitter-linked 
photographic sites --- Yfrog, Flickr and Twitpic --- are used to provide instant 
evidence of the claims being made. Link-shorteners like bit.ly are used to disseminate 
key articles via Twitter (Mason, 2012: 75). 
 
In turn, in a variation of the Canadian philosopher Marshall McLuhan’s adage that the 
‘medium is the message’, Castells theorizes that the social media’s power lies in the images 
of representation that are produced by people’s consciousness (Castells, 2012). This 
understanding of the cognitive power of the social media accords with Lee Salter’s (2003) 
arguments that the Internet is a novel technological asset for democratic communications 
‘because of its decentred, textual communications system, with content most often provided 
by users’ (Fenton, 2011: 40 ). Informal New Social Movements (NSMs) have emerged from 
the de-alignment of partisan allegiances and networks of action. These NSMs may contradict 
the previous dominant logics, to affect a new social structure (a network society), a new 
economy (a global informational economy) and anew culture (a culture of 'real virtuality'): 
 
The technological and inter-personal revolutions of the early twenty- first century  
[mean] ... it [is] now possible to conceive of living this ‘emancipated’ life as a fully 
connected ‘species-being’ on the terrain of capitalism itself --- indeed on the terrain of 
a highly marketized form of capitalism (Mason, 2012: 143). 
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Consequently, Web 2.0 has been the mechanism to inform new types of political 
resistance and has been the means through which revolts have occurred in western 
democracies, illiberal societies and against autocratic regimes. These changes have resulted 
from the deployment of digital communications within workplace and their growth 
throughout the publics’ social lives. Due to the unprecedented exponential take up of these 
social media tools by online participants, these trends enhanced individual and collective 
behaviour to confirm the revolutionary potential of the new technologies, thereby expanding 
political consciousness and magnifying ‘the crucial driver of all revolutions --- the perceived 
difference between what could be and what is’ (Mason, 2012 : 85). 
 
The Social Media and Political Movements: Opportunities and Repression in Iran and 
Turkey 
As the networked population has gained a greater access to information, social movements 
have spread across the Arab world and have often been confronted with violent repression. 
For instance, the protests associated with the Iranian ‘Green Revolution’ against the disputed 
outcome of the 2009 General Election, in which President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
controversially won, were facilitated through Facebook and Twitter. According to Annabelle 
Sreberny and Gholam Khiabany: 
 
Many Iranians on Facebook changed their profile picture to a green square that 
included the text ‘where is my vote’, while many non-Iranians tweaked the icon to 
‘where is their vote.’ Facebook turned green. It became a space for posting video ... 
articles ... photographs that had been sent by mobile or e-mail attachment from people 
in Iran. Facebook became an enormous distribution site of new or recycled materials 
(Sreberny and Khiabany, 2010: 173). 
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Simultaneously, Iranian activists used Twitter to provide real-time updates of the 
events. Therefore, an iconic video of a group of protesters marching down Tehran’s Valiasr 
Street shouting, ‘Mousavi, take back my vote!’ went viral when attached to the micro-
blogging site (Mason, 2012: 34). Another YouTube video showed what followed as the Iraqi 
riot police baton charged the unarmed crowd. This frightening material was attached to blogs, 
Facebook and Twitter sites to demonstrate the terror and chaos which accompanied the brutal 
subjugation of the political demonstrations. In addition, the protesters employed a range of 
online ‘mashups’ to achieve a variety of ranges of expression. These social media 
representations reflected a new form of political creativity which expressed an underlying 
solidarity to the cause. As a consequence, they demonstrated a politics of attraction as 
protestors could articulate their sympathy one another and engage in further activities to 
propagate their messages. 
In response, the Iranian government censored the social media by filtering the 
websites and taking them down as a result of the protests. However, ‘Freegate’ an anti-
censorship software developed by the Global Internet Freedom Consortium, was employed to 
a limited degree to offset the state controls. At an international level, western hackers kept the 
online channels open in spite of the Iranian regime’s attempts to close them down. Further, as 
the Iranian authorities cracked down on  traditional media outlets, international news 
agencies employed user-generated content  and the ‘momentum of the protests fed off this 
cycle of guerrilla newsgathering, media amplification, censorship and renewed protest’ (Ibid.: 
35). Ultimately, the Iranian protest would be lost, yet it provided: 
 
... all the ingredients were present of the uprisings that would, eighteen months later, 
galvanise the Middle East and beyond: radicalized, secular-leaning youth: a repressed 
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workers’ movement with considerable social power; uncontrollable social media; the 
restive urban poor (Ibid: 37). 
 
Similar claims were made with regard to the online mobilization of the Turkish 
protesters who demonstrated in Istanbul’s Taksim Square during the summer of 2013 
(Mason, 2013). The civil unrest began on 28 May 2013 in response to the violent eviction of 
peaceful protesters who were engaging in a sit-in against the urban re-development of Taksim 
Gezi Park. Video footage of the riot police’s excessive violence was posted online and this 
sparked a wider amount of unrest across Turkey. Subsequently, demonstrations and strikes 
were called in relation to a range of issues related to the freedom of the press, the rights of 
expression and assembly, and the Islamic Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 
encroachment upon Turkey’s secularist traditions. 
On 1 June 2013, there was a restoration of the sit-in when the police withdrew from 
Taksim Square wherein the protesters lived in tents, organized a library and a medical centre, 
distributed food banks and established their own media centre. As Turkish broadcasters 
imposed a news blackout, the camp organizers used Twitter and Facebook to provide updates 
from the occupied Gezi Park, distributed photos on Flickr and Tumblr and uploaded videos 
onto YouTube. The Twitterhashtag, “direngezipark,” was tweeted over 1.8 million times in 
three days. Invariably, the protesters used smart phone handsets to live-stream video images 
of the protests (Social Media and Participation Lab, 2013). In tandem, there were 
internationally re-tweeted messages of support for the demonstrations. For example, these 
included tweets from the Dutch footballer Wesley Sneijder, who was playing for the Istanbul 
football club Galatasaray (Hutchinson, 2013). However, the Gezi Park demonstration was 
cleared by riot police on the 15 June 2013. Consequently, videos and photos were uploaded 
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onto social media sites covering the brutal deployment of tear gas canisters and water 
cannons used to disperse the protesters.  
Throughout the crisis Erdogan declared that the rioters were mere ‘looters’ who were 
using the social networks to undermine the legitimate government. He claimed that, ‘There is 
now a menace which is called Twitter ... The best examples of lies can be found there ...  To 
me, the social media is the worst menace to society’ (Letsch, 2013). After the ‘Turkish 
Spring’ Erdogan’s antipathy to Twitter, Facebook and YouTube hardened even more. In 
2014, he was angered by the leak of damaging information gleaned from wire-taps on Twitter 
in time for the local spring elections. This led to the Turkish authorities temporarily closing 
down the micro-blogging site on 20 March 2014. This closure was later declared to be 
unconstitutional. However, Erdogan’s government also tried to find ways to close YouTube 
and Facebook. A former pro-government columnist Nazli Ilicak described the restrictions as 
being akin to ‘a civil coup’: 
 
The disruption sparked a virtual uproar with many comparing Turkey to Iran and 
North Korea, where social media platforms are tightly controlled. There were also 
calls to take to the street to protest, although some users equally called for calm. 
Turkish internet users were quick to come up with their own ways to circumvent the 
block. The hashtag #TwitterisblockedinTurkey quickly moved among the top trending 
globally (Rawlinson, 2014). 
However, as Paul Mason has commented these autocratic controls have come at cost 
to the authorities as they have realized that the Internet ‘is a network of networks, containing 
non-hierarchical pathways that simply do not allow you to switch part of it off ... (so) this is a 
signal moment [wherein] ... once-respected [statesmen have turned] into ... Canute-like 
[clowns]’ (Mason, 2014). Therefore, the dichotomy which exists between the imposition of 
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state controls to censor and to propagandize their values against the tide of alternative 
positions associated with grassroots activism has remained evident throughout the Middle 
East. 
 
Social Media and Political Movements in the Mediterranean democracies of Spain and 
Greece 
While the 2000s saw an explosion of protest movements in authoritarian Arabic states, post-
2011 witnessed uprisings in democratic European nations including the Spanish ‘Indignados’ 
and the Greek ‘Aganaktismenoi’ (outraged). The demonstrations in Spain began on 15 May 
2011 with an initial gathering in more than 50 Spanish cities and a few days later (25 May) 
activists started demonstrating in major cities in Greece organized by the ‘Direct Democracy 
Now!’ movement known as ‘Aganaktismenoi’ (the Indignant Citizens Movement). This 
unprecedented ‘protest movement domino’ had some similarities with the Middle East 
uprisings as Spanish and Greek demonstrators demanded a radical shift in politics. Indeed, 
they did not consider themselves to be represented by any of the traditional parties and 
opposed the policies adopted by their respective political elites. These case examples from 
Southern Europe were associated with calls for political and economic change in these 
financially constrained countries.  
However, the similarities stop there. While the social media networks have been 
crucial in both the Arab world and the Southern European region in mobilizing people there 
are major differences between western democracies and the repressive Arabic regimes. These 
differences are deeply rooted in the social and political realities, ranging from the different 
levels of freedom of expression, to cultural differences, to the degree of censorship, to the 
core role of religion, to women’s rights, and the different levels of access to education. It is 
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not the intention of this paper to go through these differences in detail, but two basic 
observations can be made at this point.  
First, the Spanish and Greek uprisings followed the seismic economic crisis of 2008 
in the USA, which spread across the world and most especially to Southern Europe. It 
destabilized national economies and triggered political elites into introducing austerity 
measures. These refer to actions taken by governments to reduce their budget deficit using a 
combination of spending cuts and tax rises. Second, these movements were promoted and 
maintained through the use of social media exactly in the same way as the Arab uprisings. In 
today’s highly mediatized environment it was primarily social networking platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter, rather than the traditional pro-government media which mobilized 
people in times of economic crisis and kept them connected.  
Therefore, social media driven movements in both Spain and Greece stood against 
anti-austerity measures adopted by the respective governments. At the time, Spain had the 
highest unemployment rate in Europe, reaching a Eurozone record of 21.3 per cent with the 
youth unemployment rate standing at 43.5 per cent, the highest in the European Union (in 
February 2015 Greek youth unemployment at a rate of 50.1 per cent was the highest in the 
Eurozone area - see http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/indicators, accessed 13 May 
2015). The anti-austerity movement in Greece was provoked by then government plans to cut 
public spending and raise taxes in exchange for a 110 billion Euro bail-out aimed at solving 
the Greek government debt crisis. 
Turning to Habermas’s notion of the public sphere, it could be argued that the social 
media have enabled people to take speedy and costless individual action. As common people 
experienced a decline in their incomes and the traditional media typically labelled austerity 
policies as ‘unavoidable’, they saw that the social media offered them with an opportunity to 
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raise their voices upon the streets. These ICT networks created a new sphere of ‘public 
authority’ wherein public opinion was simultaneously shaped both within national borders 
but also beyond them, providing access to a trans-national sphere of discourse made possible 
due to the global nature of the Internet. In times of deep economic crisis, Web 2.0 networks 
offered a unique opportunity to local citizens to shape their political views in the cyber space 
and translate them into action. Consequently, the German philosopher Habermas took an 
active role in the debate about the Spanish and the Greek economic crisis (and ultimately the 
European crisis). He not only condemned the parties for failing to provide a realistic, 
development-oriented and citizen-friendly strategy to overcome the crisis but also blamed the 
EU for the problematic adaptation of the single currency and the pursuance of tough fiscal 
policies (see http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/article/1242541-juergen-habermas-last-
european). 
Could these arguments lie under the protests in Spain and Greece then? Is this 
systemic crisis lying under the protestors’ agenda? And how do the social media form the 
extended public sphere? In a 2006 article Habermas gave us a hint of his ideas on the matter: 
The internet has certainly reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of writers 
and readers. However, computer mediated communication in the web can claim 
unequivocal democratic merits only for a special context: It can undermine the 
censorship of authoritarian regimes that try to control and repress public opinion. In 
the context of liberal regimes, the rise of millions of fragmented chat rooms across the 
world tend instead to lead to the fragmentation of large but politically focused mass 
audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics. Within established national 
public spheres, the online debates of web users only promote political 
communication, when news groups crystallize around the focal points of the quality 
press, for example, national newspapers and political magazines (Habermas, 2006).  
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The intellectual argument rising here originates from Marxism and Critical Theory 
(when referring to critical studies of digital media and the information society, the majority of 
scholars actually mean Marxist studies of the new media). It relates to the notion of 
mediatization (this paradigm contends that the media shapes and frames the processes and 
discourse of political communication as well as the society in which that communication 
takes place) and to the arguments on how the ‘media ways’ have colonized all aspects of our 
everyday lives, including politics and activism. Taking a critical political economy approach 
on the way social media is produced and distributed (Fuchs, 2009) the next section provides a 
critique of the social media and its democratic potential by highlighting the shortcomings that 
the information networks present for uprisings and protest movements. 
 
A Critique of the Social Media --- individualism; unreliability, polarization and the 
reconfiguration of political power? 
Online social networking sites have been often perceived as revolutionary new media tools, 
because they allow greater citizen participation in the dissemination of information and 
creation of content. The networked population is gaining greater access to information, 
enhanced opportunities to engage in public speech, and an ability to undertake collective 
action. However, as Zygmunt Bauman has argued that such forms of ‘liquid modernism’ in 
which individualist practices of social behaviour create new opportunities for the self-
realization of participation may also exacerbate uncertainties in the human condition. Most 
notably, the new patterns of social activity have paradoxically facilitated an increasing 
fluidity in people’s behaviour while producing existential fears over being imprisoned by 
such freedoms (Bauman, 2000: 8). 
Principally, the Marxist Hypermedia scholars Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron 
have argued that the ‘Californian Ideology’ which had emerged from the technophiles within 
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Silicon Valley encompassed a range of neo-liberal economic principles forged by 
individualistic and deregulated forms of free-market enterprise (Barbrook and Cameron, 
1996). In effect, such techno-populist libertarianism constructed a labour aristocracy or 
‘virtual class’ who benefitted from an inequitable distribution of resources as there was  a 
commodification of individual thought through a supply-side market transaction between 
entertainment providers and users (Wheeler, 1998; 228-9). According to Barbrook and 
Cameron this meant: 
 
Despite its radical rhetoric, the Californian Ideology is ultimately pessimistic about 
fundamental social change. ... The social liberalism of New Left and the economic 
liberalism of New Right have converged into an ambiguous dream of a hi-tech ... 
version of the plantation economy of the Old [American] South. Reflecting its deep 
ambiguity, the Californian Ideology’s technological determinism is not simply 
optimistic and emancipatory. It is simultaneously a deeply pessimistic and repressive 
vision of the future (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996: 14). 
 
These concerns underpin John Keane’s analysis of what he describes as the  
‘Decadent Media.’  Public expression has been restricted into individual discourses and the 
concentration of power within the new media has undermined the substance of democratic 
behaviour. Therefore, Keane identifies the disparities which exist between the normative 
expectations associated with ‘media abundance’ such openness, plurality, inclusion and 
equality with a more tarnished reality in which the social media  promote the intolerance of 
opinions, restrict the scrutiny of power and propagate an acceptance of the way things are 
heading. In this respect, Keane contends that elite business and state power has been 
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enhanced by data collection, censorship, spin and new mechanisms of surveillance (Keane, 
2013): 
 
Message-saturated societies can and do have effects that are harmful for democracy. 
Some of them are easily spotted. In some quarters, most obviously, media saturation 
triggers citizens’ inattention to events. While they are expected as good citizens to 
keep their eyes on public affairs, to take an interest in the world beyond their 
immediate household and neighbourhood, more than a few find it ever harder to pay 
attention to the media’s vast outpourings. Profusion breeds confusion (Keane, 2010).  
 
In trying to comprehend the sheer mass of information, users are further confronted 
by the fact that much of the Internet’s content is unreliable. As a widespread source of 
information the Internet should provide reliable, authentic and up-to-date information, but 
user generated content and blogs, in particular, are often defined as unreliable sources, 
containing personal and one-sided opinions. It is fair to say that common sense (house rules) 
and common decency should be the rule, or acceptable practice, when posting materials on 
the Internet, but as this is largely a self-regulated area, reaction comes only when someone 
complains. There is clearly a need for a better balance enforcing appropriate online 
behaviour, the assignment of liability, and protecting freedom of speech. Frankly providing 
an informed (and safe) online experience is important both for users and businesses.  
Dahlberg (2007) has found that the online debate is polarized and there is generally a 
lack of listening to others. He pointed out that the Internet and social media fail to adequately 
consider the asymmetries of power through which deliberation and consensus are achieved, 
the inter-subjective basis of meaning, the centrality of respect for difference in democracy, 
and the democratic role of ‘like-minded’ deliberative groups. What is often absent in online 
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deliberations is a consensus-based, justified and rational decision, let alone that not everyone 
affected by that decision is included. The ‘echo-chamber’ (Sunstein, 2007) effects of the 
social media mean that agreements becomes impossible, issues become ‘flamed’ and 
decision-making become subjected to the greater polarization of opinion:  
 
A political process in which like-minded people talk primarily to one another poses a 
great danger for the future of a democracy. This kind of process can lead to 
unwarrantedextremism. When various groups move in opposite directions to extreme 
positions, confusion, confrontation, accusation, and sometimes even violence may be 
the ultimate result (Sunstein, 2001: 7). 
 
Therefore, it has been asked whether the Internet rather than promoting change has 
reinforced the social institutions of economic, political and social power. Instead of the 
networked society constructing opportunities for change and reform, Couldry has argued that 
the existing power relations have remained firmly in place. First, he questions whether the 
power held within the networks can transform or affect other forms of power which exist 
outside of the network? Secondly, that the network analysis fails to address the matters of 
context and resources which are necessary for any sustainable development of political 
agency.  Third, and most fundamentally, that economic, military and legal authority cannot 
be reduced to network operations. Instead, state and corporate interest retain their central 
functions in society and combine to undermine individual autonomy and agency (Couldry, 
2012: 116-8). 
In this context, Fenton contends that the networked forms of communications cannot 
really challenge the multi-media concentrations of capital which define the political economy 
of the Internet (Fenton, 2012).  She argues that political solidarity is shaped by the material 
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experience of labour relations, struggles and conflicts rooted in the exploitation of labour by 
the pursuit of capital. Thus, solidarity is a modernist concept based on the principles of a 
political economic order and workers remain exploited by the hegemonic forces of capital. 
Therefore, for grassroots solidarity to be effective it is necessary to reorganize global 
capitalist relations so that they are not monolithic forces of impenetrable domination (Fenton, 
2011: 53). This means that the commercial power of the Internet needs to be understood as a 
significant barrier towards the proletariat’s political expression and that for collective 
identities to emerge that it must be realized: 
 
While it is true that social media provide a pleasurable means of self-expression and 
social connection, enable people to answer back to the citadels of media power and in 
certain situations ... may support the creation of radical counter-public ... Social media 
are more often about individual than collective emancipation, about presenting self 
(frequently in consumerist ... terms) rather than changing society, about entertainment 
and leisure rather than political communication ... and about social agendas shaped by 
elites and corporate power rather than a radical alternative (Curran, Freedman and 
Fenton, 2012: 180). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has considered the implications concerning the democratic potential of the social 
media in forming new types of power relations, determining alternative social movements 
and affecting changes in political consciousness. Web 2.0 tools have been seen to advance a 
greater plurality of expression and to allow for the construction of horizontal networks of 
communication. According to Castells, these information networks represent the diffusion of 
centralised power and the democratisation of political expression (Castells, 2012). In this 
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respect, the process is as important as the outcome as the social media allow for a multi-
dimensional range of opinions and values to be accumulated to shape political behaviour and 
outcomes. 
 Within this context, it is claimed that the social media facilitate the potential power of 
revolutionary groups and forces. Therefore, in Western societies and Global Southern states, 
there have been a range of examples in which populist uprisings and alternative voices have 
been raised.  Web 2.0 tools have allowed social movements to respond to public grievances 
and for the mobilisation of oppositional forces. As there was a major take-up of broadband 
Internet and mobile telephony services within Iran and Turkey, there were greater degrees of 
political engagement in these states. Yet the opportunities for the free forms of online 
expression have been qualified by retrogressive laws and censorship. In response to 
grassroots protest movements both the Iranian and Turkish authorities’ utilized repressive 
measures to stem the flow of Internet traffic to temporally close down the social networks.  
Such concerns have led to a major debate about whether the social media could overcome the 
perceived democratic deficits within these societies. 
The Spanish (Indignatos) and Greek (Aganaktismenoi) movements have demonstrated 
how the social media could be utilized to mobilize the public to take to the streets against the 
imposition of tough austerity measures. The Spanish case is important as Spain’s economy is 
the fourth largest in the Eurozone area (based on nominal GDP statistics) and its poor 
performance, alongside social upheavals due to high unemployment, not only reflects badly 
on the country but also the whole region. The Greek case is unique as Greece appears to have 
been the ‘weakest link’ of a badly manufactured Eurozone project, ready to break and 
produce financial chaos in the global markets. This has produced a deep crisis in Europe with 
unpredictable economic and indeed social and political effects. These cases help us to 
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understand how the use of social media revolutionised and expanded the public sphere to 
contribute to people’s political awakening in Southern Europe. However, it remains to be 
seen whether these movements will have lasting effects in terms of political change and a 
shift in economic direction. 
In particular, the questions of power and responsibility which have permeated the  
traditional media remain pertinent with regard to the democratic potentials (or not) of the 
social media. Questions abound concerning individualistic forms of participation; the 
trivialisation of information, the inability to distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘virtual 
communications and the saturation of information which has been endemic in an over-
abundant social media.  Effectively, can people make sense of the ranges of information they 
receive? Further, have the echo-chamber effects of a pluralistic, but highly individualist 
discourse, led to a stratified and polarized rather than collective form of political activity?  
More instrumentalist critiques have questioned the economic, political and social 
constraints that continue to abound within cyberspace and suggest that communications 
networks reinforce rather than challenge the institutions of capitalism. In particular, Fenton  
argues that technological utopianism masks the fact that ‘the Internet does not transcend 
global capitalism but is deeply involved with it by virtue of the ... discourses of capitalism ... 
in which people who use it are drenched in’ (Fenton, 2012: 124). Therefore, the democratic 
potential of the social media remains contested. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether 
the social network sites will prove to be beneficial or detrimental for the extension of 
citizens’ democratic rights. 
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